Here we have the case of U.S. v. James Vest (Case No. 06-cr-30011-DRH), US District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, HERNDON, District Judge.
In this case, an Illinois State Policeman is being prosecuted by the US Government (BATF&E) for unlawful possession of a machine gun in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(o) and 924(a)(2) and for possessing a machine gun transferred in violation 26 U.S.C. §§ 5812, 5861(b) and 5871.
The defendant has made the pretrial motions to dismiss on the grounds that the laws are unconstitutionally vague "as applied" to this case.
During the course of the briefings (and a careful reading of the 26 page Dismissal) the sole objection of the Government was that the officer had the weapon at home. It was noted by the Government that the officer never used the weapon for anything other than official police business. The Government was caught in its own complicity when questioned by the court as to certain hypotheticals. i.e., that Vest, as a Lead Rifle Instructor had lawful authority to issue like weapons to other officers on a firing range, who could not be prosecuted, but that his superiors had no lawful authority to issue the weapon to him. That as the Equipment Officer, he had lawful authority to issue like weapons to the Illinois TRT (which were kept at home) but that his superiors had no lawful authority to issue said weapon to Vest.
This led the court to believe that the Government could, and in this case did, arbitrarily prosecute any officer. A requisite for vagueness.
Another argument of the Government was that the institution itself was the holder of the weapon and not the individual actors. The Court itself demolished this argument, as who is the lawful authority of the institution, if not the actors themselves! Under this interpretation, even a BATF&E agent who takes possession of an unlawful weapon then becomes an instant felon as the agent is not the lawful authority, under the Governments definition. Again, another criteria to "as applied" vagueness.
A look at the offending statutes as supplied by the court:
The court inquired:
In conclusion:
What does this mean for the everyday citizen? Not a whole lot. But I suspect, any chink in the armor of 922(o) is a win for us all, nonetheless!
Since the District Court was reduced to ascertaining legislative intent and quoted passages of the Senate in enacting the FOPA, it may well be that such can be done in another well crafted and not too dissimilar case.
In this case, an Illinois State Policeman is being prosecuted by the US Government (BATF&E) for unlawful possession of a machine gun in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(o) and 924(a)(2) and for possessing a machine gun transferred in violation 26 U.S.C. §§ 5812, 5861(b) and 5871.
The defendant has made the pretrial motions to dismiss on the grounds that the laws are unconstitutionally vague "as applied" to this case.
During the course of the briefings (and a careful reading of the 26 page Dismissal) the sole objection of the Government was that the officer had the weapon at home. It was noted by the Government that the officer never used the weapon for anything other than official police business. The Government was caught in its own complicity when questioned by the court as to certain hypotheticals. i.e., that Vest, as a Lead Rifle Instructor had lawful authority to issue like weapons to other officers on a firing range, who could not be prosecuted, but that his superiors had no lawful authority to issue the weapon to him. That as the Equipment Officer, he had lawful authority to issue like weapons to the Illinois TRT (which were kept at home) but that his superiors had no lawful authority to issue said weapon to Vest.
This led the court to believe that the Government could, and in this case did, arbitrarily prosecute any officer. A requisite for vagueness.
Another argument of the Government was that the institution itself was the holder of the weapon and not the individual actors. The Court itself demolished this argument, as who is the lawful authority of the institution, if not the actors themselves! Under this interpretation, even a BATF&E agent who takes possession of an unlawful weapon then becomes an instant felon as the agent is not the lawful authority, under the Governments definition. Again, another criteria to "as applied" vagueness.
A look at the offending statutes as supplied by the court:
andTHE LAW ENFORCEMENT EXCEPTION – 26 U.S.C. § 922(o)(2)(A)
18 U.S.C. § 922(o) reads (emphasis added):
(o)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), it shall be unlawful for any person to transfer or possess a machine gun.
(2) This subsection does not apply with respect to--
(A) a transfer to or by, or possession by or under the authority of, the United States or any department or agency thereof or a State, or a department, agency, or political subdivision thereof; or
(B) any lawful transfer or lawful possession of a machine gun that was lawfully possessed before the date this subsection takes effect.
In the above, the Court noted that the Law Enforcement Exemption of 922(o) was not to be found in the registration section of the NFA. Yet another test of vagueness met.26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(b) and (d)
26 U.S.C. § 5861 provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person–
(b) to receive or possess a firearm transferred to him in violation of the provisions of this chapter; or
(d) to receive or possess a firearm which is not registered to him in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record;
The court inquired:
In the end analysis, putting oneself in the place of Trooper Vest, who is required to arm himself with an automatic weapon from time to time, taking the Boyce test into account and applying this particular statute, how is he ever to know when he is legally possessing any automatic weapon, whether the one at issue or any other? He is not the State Police, the entity, as the Government suggests is required. Nor does the statute give him guidance as to upon whom he can legally rely for authority without fear of prosecution. Boyce suggests he is at peril, if the statute is valid. If he refuses to possess an automatic weapon on his job, is he insubordinate and subject to discipline? What is he to do?
In conclusion:
The Government will undoubtedly appeal (7th Circuit), but may not get any further than they did with the District Court. Since on appeal, they can not use any new arguments, only embellish the arguments used at trial, it leaves one to wonder what the Government may hope to accomplish!The Court finds that all three Counts against Vest as stated in the Superceding Indictment (Doc. 30) must be dismissed on the grounds that § 922(o)(2)(A), and §§ 5861(b) and (d), are unconstitutionally vague as applied to Vest for his possession of a machine gun while serving as a police officer, equipment officer and/or lead rifle instructor for the Illinois State Police. As such, Defendant Vest’s Motions to Dismiss the Superceding Indictment (Docs. 38 & 55), based on the asserted grounds of unconstitutional vagueness “as applied” to him, are hereby GRANTED. Counts I, II, and III are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.
What does this mean for the everyday citizen? Not a whole lot. But I suspect, any chink in the armor of 922(o) is a win for us all, nonetheless!
Since the District Court was reduced to ascertaining legislative intent and quoted passages of the Senate in enacting the FOPA, it may well be that such can be done in another well crafted and not too dissimilar case.