Assuming that military rifles are considered "quality", that is certainly not true. When the Gewehr 98 was adopted in 1898, the "S" (.323") bullet did not exist and one of the advantages seen for retaining the 8mm was the vast quantity of ammunition available. So for the first, roughly, 5 years of Model 98 production, the barrels were made for the old cartridge.
Yes, you are correct, the S cartridge was adopted in 1905 and hundreds of thousands of M98's had to be converted to that cartridge. Unlike the M1888 conversion which Dr Storz has chapters on, the conversion of the M98 to the S cartridge is barely half a page. Apparently it went well, must not have had the barrel bursting problems of the M1888's. All Dr Storz says is that the M98 chambers were "ground", which I assume, we would say reamed. None of these reference books have an index, but a quick text scanning did not reveal anything about barrel replacement.
I do not recall seeing any early 98's with an "S" mark, but then rifles from those years are scarce.
Dr Storz shows a picture of one. A surviving example would be rare considering that these rifles should have been converted around 1905, then had to survive a nine years of peacetime use without rebarreling, then WW1. If they survived WW1 there were massive conversions and rebarreling that took place post WW1 and pre WW2.
Assuming that military rifles are considered "quality", that is certainly not true
I was thinking of quality civilian use rifles, such as a factory sporter. Obviously any 8mm civilian rifle built before 1905 would use the early cartridge, but after 1905, the market would quickly move towards the S cartridge dimensions. I am aware of some M1895 Winchesters that were in 30-03, (don't know the dates, but they would have been pre WW1) but can anyone remember any 1939 production rifles in 30-03? The OP has a 1939 rifle and I would be very surprised if it was 0.318", and if he slugs the barrel, we will find out.
Obviously, the purpose of proving is not to destroy guns; it is to fire the gun with an overcharge to detect defective barrels; only a bad barrel will fail to stand the overcharge (about 50% above the standard working pressure of the round).
The proof laws I read indicate European proof is 30% over standard. I do not know if there are any uniform standards for American proof, and if there were, they still don't have the force of law, so they would be simply for guidance to the manufacturer. It is very possible that a number of American manufacturer's simply function test their firearms and ship them out with a warranty card.
Virtually every time I mention my use of lubricated cartridges, or I recommend lubricating cartridges, I get a knee jerk "Oh my God!"
reaction. Then I am constantly reminded that lubricated cartridges were used in the British proof test, with the assumption that lubricating cartridges has to be dangerous because the purpose of proof is to blow up the mechanism. The second part of the sentence is a fictional story that people create in their minds, and after, I believe, reading Hatcher's Notebook. Hatcher mentions that the early single heat treat 03's were blowing up in the field, so Springfield Armory increased the proof pressures, to blow up more 03's before they got out the door. Somehow people contort this section into a belief that the purpose of proof was to blow up rifles and that lubricating cartridges helps that process. Nothing is further from the truth. Unless the cartridge is lubricated the locking mechanism is not fully loaded, due to parasitic friction between the case body and the chamber. Therefore any proof tests with dry cartridges and dry chambers is technically unjustifiable as the locking mechanism is not as uniformly loaded as the chamber. This is recognized in NATO EPVAT testing.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_EPVAT_testing NATO EPVAT testing specifically calls out the testing of firearms with an oiled proof load as the final test.
Something that people miss in Hatcher's whitewash of the Army's actions is that Springfield Armory did not attempt to figure out why their rifles were blowing up in the field, nor why these rifles were structurally deficient, which should have lead to eliminating the problem within the factory and not shipping defective rifles to the field. Instead of examining their processes and finding the root cause, the Army implemented the lazy man's approach: they raised proof pressures at the end of the production line and blew up more rifles. Implicit, but unstated in their actions, is that the Army accepted that they would continue to make defective rifles, a certain percentage of structurally defective rifles would pass a higher pressure proof, would be shipped to the troops, and would eventually fail in the field. And that is exactly what happened, structurally deficient rifles did pass the elevated proof test only to fail later in the hands of Troops, injuring many.
