Because an agency’s interpretation of a criminal statute is not entitled to Chevron deference and because the ATF’s Final Rule is not the best interpretation of § 5845(b), we REVERSE the district court’s judgment and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion
Thirty years later, in response to several high-profile assassinations, including those of President John F. Kennedy, Senator Robert F. Kennedy, and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Congress passed the Gun Control Act of 1968, which, among other restrictions, prohibited felons, drug users, and the mentally ill from purchasing firearms. Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (amending 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-28 and I.R.C. ch. 53). The 1968 Act’s definition of a machine gun largely adopted the 1934 Act’s definition but also expanded its scope to include other parts or devices that could convert a weapon into a machine gun:
The term “machinegun” means any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger. The term shall also include the frame or receiver of any such weapon, any combination of parts designed and intended for use in converting a weapon into a machinegun, and any combination of parts from which a machinegun can be assembled if such parts are in the possession or under the control of a person.
§ 5845(b), 82 Stat. at 1231
Thus, as currently codified, the statutory definition of a machine gun reads:
The term “machinegun” means any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger. The term shall also include the frame or receiver of any such weapon, any part designed and intended solely and exclusively, or combination of parts designed and intended, for use in converting a weapon into a machinegun, and any combination of parts from which a machinegun can be assembled if such parts are in the possession or under the control of a person.
26 U.S.C. § 5845(b) (2019)
(Emphasis added)It is a “‘fundamental canon of statutory construction’ that words generally should be ‘interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning . . . at the time Congress enacted the statute.’” Wis. Cent. Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 2074 (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)). The separation of powers requires that we interpret the statute “as written,” and “we may not rewrite the statute simply to accommodate [a] policy concern.” Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524, 529, 531 (2019). Whether a bump stock falls within § 5845(b)’s definition of a machine gun is a question of statutory interpretation, and “[t]he starting point for any question of statutory interpretation is the language of the statute itself.” United States v. Coss, 677 F.3d 278, 283 (6th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In determining the meaning of a statute, we have several interpretative tools at our disposal, including contemporaneous dictionaries, the structure and context of the rest of the statute, and descriptive canons of statutory interpretation, such as ejusdem generis, expressio unius, and noscitur a sociis. See Keen v. Helson, 930 F.3d 799, 802-04 (6th Cir. 2019); Arangure, 911 F.3d at 339-40. For the following reasons, we find that a bump stock does not fall within the statutory definition of a machine gun.
Slip op. at 21.In sum, for criminal statutes, where the primary question is what conduct should be condemned and punished, the first rationale of Chevron deference—deferring to an agency’s expertise—is unconvincing because the agency’s technical specialized knowledge does not assist in making the value-laden judgment underlying our criminal laws.
Slip op. at 26.Because the community has the right to determine what moral wrongs should be punished—a practice that predates our Constitution—that responsibility may be entrusted to only the branch most accountable to the people: the legislature. And it may not be blithely delegated away.
2wheelwander said:I read yesterday SCOTUS refused to hear the appeal in consideration of overturning the law. - So it stands.
There's also the pesky truth that the ATF had previously ruled that the bump stock was not a machine gun, yet the President did and determined them in violation of the NFA.Let me first say that it is very likely the government will ask for a rehearing en banc because, if it does not, the panel's opinion on Chevron deference in (some) criminal cases will become binding circuit precedent. The Sixth Circuit does not hear a lot of cases en banc, but this could be one they take. I doubt the government would seek Supreme Court review unless going this route first. Even then, it might not seek Supreme Court review since this is a preliminary injunction which is restricted by its own terms to the states in the Sixth Circuit (Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee) and to "the parties themselves." Slip opinion at 36. The Supreme Court might have another shot at it following final determination of the issues. The Sixth Circuit also noted that the Supreme Court has often allowed circuit splits for a time so that more courts could weigh in on the issues.
The decision not to give Chevron deference to agency interpretation of criminal statutes is much more impactful than the bump-stock issue itself. Without getting too lawyerly, the Chevron case provides that courts give administrative agencies a great deal of deference when interpreting a statute. But, Chevron did not involve criminal penalties.
The Sixth Circuit opinion rejected the primary rationale for Chevron deference when interpreting statutes with criminal penalties (or at least some of them). Chevron is premised on the assumption that administrative agencies have expertise of the subject matter they regulate and that this expertise should be given weight. The majority opinion rang a church bell, warning of of Executive Branch overreach: "Federal criminal laws are not administrative edicts handed down upon the masses as if the administrators were God delivering the Ten Commandments to Moses on Mount Sinai." Slip op. at 20 (emphasis added).
The court then summarized its reason for rejecting this rationale for Chevron deference:
Slip op. at 21.
The majority also thought the agency interpretation violated separation of powers:Slip op. at 26.
The court also thought that an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute against a person charged violated the rule of lenity in criminal cases and raised concerns about fair notice in this particular instances because of a change in the agency's interpretation.
Finally, the majority opinion then rejected the government's interpretation that a bump stock was a machine gun since the shooter only pulled his or her finger only once. Instead, it interpreted the statute to mean that there was no machine gun where the mechanical trigger itself would be depressed (and released) for each shot, as is the case where a bump stock is employed.
I've only hit a couple of high points in the opinion. There's lots of discussion about case law and why the court felt free to not follow the lead of two other circuits on this issue.